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Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking, Intractable 
Dilemmas in Search of Effective Solutions 
Emilios Avgouleas* 
I Introduction 
Banks have been a ubiquitous feature of economic life since at least the eighteenth century1 and 
well before neoclassical economics incorporated capital in its growth models, chiefly though J. 
M. Keynes’s writings. In modern times the concept of availability of capital has been updated, or 
even stretched, to be closely associated with the concept of financial sector development and 
attendant levels of access to (external) finance.2 Yet, while the value of an enlarged financial 
                                                
* Chair in International Banking Law & Finance, Head of Comemrcial Law, University of Edinburgh. I 
owe a debt of gratitude for conversations I had in the context of drafting this paper to Charles Goodhart, 
all errors remain mine. 
 
1 The best example is the Bank of Scotland, part of the Lloyds Group today, which was established in 
Edinburgh in 1695 with the purpose of conducting commercial banking operations. For the history of the 
Bank of Scotland that set up as a rival to the Bank of England albeit with different focus as the former 
was established to manage government debt see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_Scotland. 
 
2 For a collection of the most important research substantiating the role of finance in economic growth see 
A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine (eds, Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country 
Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development (MIT Press, 2003). It seems that the findings of the 
cited studies in the MIT volume were not as instructive as those researchers made us believe and in their 
own subsequent writings they have themselves admitted that the indicators  they used were very crude 
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sector remains disputed, given its perennial fragility due to its preponderance to generate booms 
and bursts,3 the economic and social utility of a savings-based economy is not. This is not just 
the experience of older societies but even more so it is a widespread and largely unchallenged – 
probably because it is true – assumption of modern societies. 
For example, one of the least mentioned utilities of savings-based economies is that 
banking (and capital markets) operating in a competitive environment and outside government 
interventions on their lending decisions and other capital allocation decisions can facilitate 
individuals’ economic and social mobility.4 Affording individuals or small enterprises access to 
credit and savings services that might not have been available otherwise, whether by means of 
mainstream banking, or community banking, or even microfinance schemes, can help mobilize 
individuals’ or communities’ creative talents. Moreover granting to the poor access to saving 
accounts facilitates their forward planning and to some extent alleviates any future short-term 
income shocks that may experience (e.g., unemployment), making them more proactive and 
                                                                                                                                                       
and it is still unclear which of the key properties of the financial system provide the best measure of its 
development and contribution to economic growth. See for a summary of the findings and conclusions of 
contemporary financial development research see M. Cihak, A. Demirguc-Kunt et al., “Measuring 
Financial Development” VOX column, 25 April 2013, available at www.voxeu.org/article/measuring-
financial-development. 
 
3 On the value of financial stability in fostering growth see D. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic 
Growth, and the Role of Law (CUP, 2007). See also T. Beck, “The Role of Finance Economic 
Development: Benefits, Risks, and Politics” in D. C. Mueller, The Oxford Handbook of Capitalism (OUP, 
2012), online, chapter 6. 
 
4 See R. Rajan, L. Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists:Unleashing the Power of Financial 
Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (Princeton, 2004). 
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entrepreneurial.5 These benefits accrue to societies in addition to those flowing from the ability 
of the financial system to finance long-term development or infrastructure projects with strong 
social utility. 
Arguably, financial sector development is not a goal in itself it is rather a means to an end. 
Yet in the past thirty years financial markets have developed into a thick and complex web of 
claims and counterclaims, tradable assets, and risks. The transformation that banks have 
undergone in the past three decades has made the struggle to keep them safe, ever harder, and 
more challenging. 
Whether operating under the principle of limited or unlimited liability, on a purely 
domestic or international basis, as mainstream lenders or as part of complex organizations, 
within a free banking environment or under the protective “wings” of the lender of last resort, 
banks have never been straightforward creatures. They normally operate on the basis of a 
fractional reserve system, trading on the basis of a large multiple over shareholders’ equity and 
only keeping small reserves against their liabilities, that is, money entrusted (lent) to them by 
depositors and bondholders. Fractional reserve banking presupposes a strong amount of trust in 
the safety of individual banks and the stability of the entire financial system. But such confidence 
can easily evaporate either because of trouble within a bank or developments in other parts of the 
                                                
5 For analysis and extensive relevant bibliography see E. Avgouleas, “International Financial Regulation, 




financial system or even outside the financial system in the wider national and international 
economy.6 
The pace of bank business transformation has been unprecedented in the past three 
decades. This is a period that roughly coincides with global trade liberalisation, and effective and 
rapid communications, normally defined as the era of globalisation. This era in global banking 
has two distinct phases, the period between 1990 and 2008 and the period post-2008. During the 
first phase the biggest banks gradually moved to a purely multifunctional–universal bank model 
and global geographic coverage of operations, as banks became increasingly transnational. 
The second phase is exclusively defined by a tidal wave of regulatory reforms at the 
national, regional, and global level. One of the most important consequences of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) was that, due to the threat of systemic disruption, it became impossible to 
tolerate the failure of even medium-sized investment banks, like Lehman Brothers. National 
treasuries had to put together expensive bail-out plans in order to rescue severely 
undercapitalized banks in crisis, from going bankrupt and thus reinforcing a vicious chain effect 
of panic, contagion, and instability. Some of these bailouts proved very expensive, though the 
final cost was not the same in all jurisdictions. Ensuing reforms have aimed at remedying the 
perceived causes of the GFC and prevent the reoccurrence of a crisis of such magnitude. 
The notion of market discipline aiding financial stability in the financial sector is 
sometimes stretched to a breaking point for two all-pervasive reasons. First, shareholders 
normally care little for financial stability threats and much more about their returns on equity 
                                                
6 The risk of a confidence shock spreading throughout the financial system (contagion) is in fact the 
fundamental rationale of banking regulation. See C. Goodhart, et al. Financial Regulation: Why, How and 
Where Now? (Routledge, 1998). 
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(ROE). Secondly, most modern financial institutions are too complex to be properly subjected to 
the rigours of market discipline. Even when shareholders and creditors have the right incentives 
to be effective monitors, balance sheet complexity will remain a challenging obstacle.7 Moreover, 
any reliance on market discipline acting as a restraint to the operations of large and/or 
interconnected banks entirely evaporated, reinforcing moral hazard (normally called too-big-to-
fail (TBTF). 
This chapter intends to provide a balanced, all-encompassing, and in-depth discussion of 
the social utility of big banks in a fractional reserve banking system in the post-2008 context 
utilizing a very wide array of empirical and theoretical works. It will, thus, discuss the dilemmas 
surrounding the famed demolition of the TBTF bank in the postreform era. To this effect, the 
chapter will explain that while well calibrated structural reforms and special resolution regimes 
can certainly help to alleviate the TBTF problem in the banking sector, they will not eliminate it. 
At the same time, implementation of the suggested alternative of full-reserve, limited-purpose, or 
narrow-banking models would, practice, create more problems than it would solve. 
Arguably, until the present model of fractional reserve banking is radically overhauled, 
mostly through effective regulatory systems and structural reforms that refocus global finance on 
long-term growth objectives, societies may have to provide a form of fiscal backstop to big 
(mostly ring-fenced or separated) commercial banks. This may be the social cost that has to be 
paid for the benefit of fractional reserve banking. It ought not to be confused with the abuses 
surrounding the TBTF subsidy in the pre-2008 era. 
                                                
7 For analytical discussion see E. Avgouleas and J. Cullen, “Market Discipline and EU Corporate 
Governance Reform in the Banking Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries”, 41 Journal of 
Law and Society 28–50 (2014). 
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This chapter is divided in five sections. The first section is the present introduction. The 
second section will discuss the historical emergence of the multifunctional banks, also called 
megabanks, as the dominant model of bank organisation. The third section will provide an in 
depth evaluation of the costs and benefits of large multifunctional (TBTF) banks with special 
reference the economics of bank organisation and the TBTF subsidy utilising an extensive range 
of empirical and theoretical studies. To this effect, the section will provide a balanced discussion 
of the risks and challenges posed by the existence of large multifunctional banks, which, in the 
absence of an effective structural regulation and a failure proof resolution framework is bound to 
be TBTF. The fourth section provides a critical evaluation of the remedial regulatory and policy 
reforms that have already been implemented or are under way to deal with the TBTF problem. It 
will also discuss the Kotlikoff and Kay proposals for a full reserve (narrow – limited purpose) 
banking system. Section V provides the conclusion. 
II Emergence of the Megabank Model 
A Introductory Remarks 
Outside Continental Europe, chiefly Switzerland and Germany, the business model of financial 
conglomeration that is best manifested by megabanks emerged as late as the 1990s as a result of 
three factors. First, financial innovation both eroded the traditional boundaries between 
commercial and investment banking, as a host of derivatives products and financing techniques 
could be used by both kinds of institutions and created a strong movement towards 
disintermediation. The latter meant that profit margins became ever thinner for traditional 
lenders that did not normally engage in capital market activities. At the same time, investment 
7 
 
banks needed an ever larger capital and funding base in order to compete successfully under the 
new conditions. That larger capital and funding base could be ensured through the merger of an 
investment bank with a lending institution. Such mergers were seen at the time as the apex of 
capital optimization in the banking sector; investment banking would bring higher profit margins 
and commercial banking the wide, cheap, and safe funding basis ensured through acceptance of 
retail and commercial deposits. 
The second reason was the global, and possibly misguided, trend toward financial 
liberalization, which lied at the heart of economic globalisation, together with trade liberalization. 
International financial liberalization was achieved through the abolition of national controls over 
cross-border capital flows and of restrictions over foreign entry to domestic financial services 
markets. Globalization, in turn, presented big banks and their public regulators with two 
important challenges: first, how to build big institutions that could compete successfully at the 
global stage, and, second, by which means this global industry could be regulated? The latter was 
achieved through the nearly universal endorsement of the prudential regulation standards8 issued 
in the last two decades by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
The third reason was deregulation of the financial services industry in the western world. 
First, in the United Kingdom, where, unlike the United States, segregation between commercial 
and investment banking institutions was informal, so called “big bang” of 27 October 1986 
                                                
8 Professor J. J. Norton was the first legal scholar who identified and seriously examined the emerging 
global consensus for banking regulation. Norton’s work set the course for many subsequent studies. See J. 
J. Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards (The Hague: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1995), and 
Norton (ed.), Bank Regulation and Supervision in the 1990s (Kluwer Law, 1991); Norton and I. Fletcher, 
International Banking Regulation and Supervision: Change and Transformation in the 1990s (Kluwer 
Law International, 1994). 
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meant the disappearance of traditional stock jobbers.9 This created a chain reaction, which 
gradually led to the acquisition of most of the traditional discount houses and merchant banks, 
either by foreign competitors or large UK commercial banks. The latter meant a huge shift of 
business culture for the big UK banks, which eventually culminated to the disastrous acquisitions 
and business policies followed by the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Halifax Bank of Scotland 
two decades later. 
B Repealing Glass-Steagall 
The United States had in place the last relics of depression era legislation, so called Glass-
Steagall Act,10 until 1999. The core sections of the Banking Act of 1933, which referred to banks’ 
securities operations and were defined as the Glass-Steagall Act, were sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. 
Section 16, as amended by the Banking Act of 1935, generally prohibited Federal Reserve 
member banks from purchasing securities for their own account. Sections 16 and 21 also forbade 
deposit-taking institutions from engaging in the business of “issuing, underwriting, selling, or 
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stock, bonds, debentures, 
notes or other securities”, except holdings of U.S. treasury bills and other public sector debt 
obligations. The Act (section 20) also prohibited member banks from affiliating with a company 
“engaged principally” in the “issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at 
wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other 
                                                
9 On the disappearance of the LSE’s stock jobbers and their business culture see Bernard Attard, “Making 
a Market, The Jobbers of London Stock Exchange, 1800–1986”, (2000) 7 Financial History Review 5. 
 
10 Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162, codified in several sections of the United States Code, now repealed. 
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securities”. In fact, cognizant of the scope for conflicts of interest section 32 prohibited a 
member bank from having interlocking directorships or close officer or employee relationships 
with a firm “principally engaged” in securities underwriting and distribution, even if there was 
no common ownership or corporate affiliation between the commercial bank and the investment 
company. 
By the time of its formal repeal in 1999,11 Glass-Steagall type restrictions had been 
seriously eroded, 12 especially as regards the ability of commercial banks to acquire securities 
affiliates,13 and the trend towards megamergers between financial services institutions had 
already set in. Considerable effort was put into debunking the historical underpinnings of the 
Glass-Steagall Act and to showing that the risks and abuses were not as great as its proponents 
claimed.14 Yet, the pressure to repeal Glass Steagall did not originate from investment banks but 
it was more commercial banks’ desire to acquire a slice in lucrative securities underwritings to 
boost their income. 
                                                
11 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(1999). For today’s reader that has the benefit of hindsight it seems inexplicable that so few U.S. senators 
opposed at the time the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act. See “Glass-Steagall Act: The Senators And 
Economists Who Got It Right”, Huffington Post, 11 May 2009, available at 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/11/glass-steagall-act-the-se_n_201557.html 
 
12 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133. 
 
13 For example, in June 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court (by denying certiorari) upheld a lower court’s ruling 
accepting the Federal Reserve Board’s April 1987 approval for member banks to affiliate with companies 
underwriting commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and securities backed by mortgages and 
consumer debts, as long as the affiliate does not principally engage in those activities. 
 




But since mid-1990s the motives for the repeal of the act had become even more sinister 
and mostly referred to serious gains in terms of stock prices that accrued to megamergers,15 
especially those hailed by “learned” market analyst as augmenting income in the long-term and 
creating massive economies of scale especially on the sell side.16 This trend was culminated in 
the merger of Citicorp (a banking company) with Travellers, a financial conglomerate with 
several insurance subsidiaries and the securities firm (Salomon Smith Barney) to produce 
Citigroup. This merger preceded and probably “coerced” the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act.17 It 
was followed by the subsequent merger of JP Morgan with Chase Manhattan in 2000. These 
mergers made megabanks a menacing reality both to competitors and consumers and the 
financial system.18 
                                                
15 For an overview of this phase in the history of American banking see L. Baxter “Betting Big: Value, 
Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance”, 31 Review of Banking and 
Financial Law 784–800 (2011–12), pp. 765–877. 
 
16 For the timeline of long efforts to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act and an uncorroborated estimate of the 
cost of lobbying for the final repeal of the Act in 1999 see Editorial, “The Long Demise of Glass-Stegall, 
A chronology tracing the life of the Glass-Steagall Act, from its passage in 1933 to its death throes in the 
1990s, and how Citigroup’s Sandy Weill dealt the coup de grâce”,. Available at 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html. 
 
17 See for the influence of the Citigroup merger on the repeal of Glass-Stegall Act and the enactment of 
the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act. See A. E. Wilmarth ”̳The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis”, 41 Connecticut Law Review 963 
(2009), pp.972–975. 
 
18 The figures that this consolidation represented in the United States are staggering: “More than 5,400 
mergers took place in the U.S. banking industry from 1990 to 2005, involving more than $5.0 trillion in 
banking assets. In seventy-four of those mergers, both the acquiring bank and the target bank had assets 
exceeding $10 billion. As a consequence of the bank merger wave, the share of U.S. banking assets held 
11 
 
C The EU “Levels” the Playing Field 
The same drive toward deregulation, by means, in this case, of harmonization legislation with the 
explicit intent of levelling the playing field between continental European universal banking and 
the informally segregated model operated in Britain and in some other EU member states, meant 
that EU legislation actively promoted the universal bank model.19 Thus, it fostered the creation 
of several megabanks in the United Kingdom and rest of Europe, though of a size much smaller 
than that of their U.S. counterparts. 
Liberalization and the dismantling of barriers between commercial and investment 
banking also meant a large number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions,20 creating large 
complex financial conglomerates with very strong international business, asset, and deposit base. 
A major EU measure, ostensibly designed to counteract market risks associated with securities 
and other activities, was the Capital Adequacy Directive (the CAD).21 In fact the CAD had as 
                                                                                                                                                       
by the ten largest banks more than doubled, rising from twenty-five percent in 1990 to fifty-five percent 
in 2005. The three largest U.S. banks – Citigroup, Bank of America (BofA) and JP Morgan Chase (Chase) 
– expanded rapidly after 1990, and each bank held more than $1.5 trillion of assets at the end of 2007. 
Wachovia, the fourth largest U.S. bank, also grew rapidly, and its assets exceeded $780 billion at the end 
of 2007. Ibid. pp. 975–976. (notes omitted). 
19 The chief example of such EU legislation is the Second Banking Directive 89/646/EEC [1989] OJ L 
386/1, replaced by Directive 2006/48/EC [2006) OJ L 177/1 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions. The Second Banking Directive allowed deposit-taking European Banks to 
also engage in the kind of investment market activities that were usually reserved, at least outside of 
Germany, for securities firms and non-deposit taking investment banks. 
 
20 For the full discussion see R. Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (OUP, 2nd ed., 2002), chapter 3. 
 
21 Directive on the capital adequacy of investments firms and credit institutions, 93/6/EEC [1993] OJ 
L141/1. See M. Hall, “The Measurement and Assessment of Market Risk: a Comparison of the European 
12 
 
much to do with competitive concerns as with addressing problems of risk. There was much 
criticism of this approach for protecting the universal bank from competition from nonbank 
securities firms.22 
III “Unbundling” the TBTF Bank Conundrum 
A Introductory  Remarks 
It is widely argued that the reason for the oligopolistic and highly concentrated structure of 
banking markets is that bigger institutions enjoy funding advantages. As explained later this 
assertion is largely true and also amounts to a clear distortion of competition. At the same time, it 
is not clear how detrimental is the impact of these distortions on customer welfare. Either way in 
order to unpick the different elements of the TBTF bank conundrum we best consider first how 
these banks became TBTF. The rationales for the historical trend toward repeal of legislation that 
controlled conglomeration and to some extent size have already been discussed. However, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the push toward conglomeration was disconnected from 
                                                                                                                                                       
Commission and Basle Committee Approaches”, BNL Quarterly Rev., no 194, Sept. 1995, 183; G. 
Walker, “The Law of Financial Conglomerates”, (1996) 30 Int’l. L 57. CAD has since been supplanted by 
EU legislation and EU banks and investment firms’ capital requirements are regulated today by 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms [2013] OJ L 176/18, normally called 
the EU Credit Requirements Regulation (CRR). 
 
22 For example, E. Dimson and P. Marsh, The Debate on International Capital Requirements (London, 
City Research Project, Subject Report 8, 1994). 
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two key shareholder concerns: first, organizational advantages, that is, attainment of economies 
of scale and scope, and, secondly, capital optimization, namely, maximization of ROE. 
In the case, of TBTF banks the aforementioned shareholder considerations are 
inextricably linked to the well-documented funding advantage that TBTF banks enjoy, so-called 
TBTF subsidy. Thus, in the next few paragraphs I, first, discuss claims and counterclaims in 
relation to the social utility of TBTF banks. Then, I turn, with the aid of contemporary empirical 
studies, to discuss the nature of the TBTF subsidy, and the validity of economies of scale and 
scope assumptions about TBTF banks and the impact of TBTF banks on competition. In this 
context, I also look at the role of ROE optimization by means of increased leverage of what 
essentially were failure proof organizations. 
B Benefits and Disutilities of TBTF Banks 
The universal banking model acquired strong supporters among the economics profession in the 
1990s and 2000s.23 It was argued that permitting banks to conduct securities and insurance 
activities presented several advantages24: (a) exploitation of economies of scale and scope in 
gathering and processing information about firms, (b) risk diversification, (c) building a 
diversified base of activities leads to a more stable source of income and thus more stable banks, 
and (d) building reputation capital with clients, and increasing the franchise value of banks and 
                                                
23 JR Barth, G Caprio, Jr, and R Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?”, NBER 
Working Paper No. W9323, November 2002. 
 
24 See JR Barth, RD Brumbaugh and JA Wilcox, “The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad 
Banking”, (2000) 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives 191; S. Claessens, D. Klingebiel, “Competition 
and Scope of Activities in Financial Services”, World Bank, mimeo, April 2000. 
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thereby augment incentives for banks to behave prudently. 25  Also it was suggested that 
restricting the kind of activities a bank may undertake hinders bank development26 and thus 
economic growth. 
Arguably, greater diversification of earnings may be associated with more stable, safer, 
and ultimately more valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash-
flows from a firm’s various financial intermediation activities, the greater the benefits of 
diversification.27 In principle this should have produced higher credit quality and higher debt 
ratings (lower bankruptcy risk), therefore lower cost of capital than faced by narrower, more 
focused firms. Likewise, greater earnings stability should bolster share prices. Key to the 
business of banking is risk processing and absorption. And confidence in a bank requires it to be 
safe. Diversification is then needed to be able to absorb risks augmenting bank safety. 
But the recent crisis has proven beyond doubt that these welfare gains did not materialize. 
I postulate that this is due to three reasons none of which is directly related to the TBTF subsidy 
that will be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs: (a) TBTF banks suffered severe agency 
                                                
25 For the perceived relationship between franchise value and bank management’s incentives to behave 
prudently see M. Keeley, “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking”, (1990) 80 American 
Economic Review 1183–1200; R. S. Demsetz, M. R. Staidenberg and P. E. Strahan, “Banks with 
Something to Lose: The Disciplinary Role of Franchise Value”, (1996) 2 Economic Policy Review 1. 
 
26 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002), supra note 23, pp 31–32. 
 




problems; (b) homogenization induced by rational herding and externally imposed capital 
regulations;28 and (c) cultural changes. 
Agency problems within TBTF banks are caused by three factors. First, shareholders 
have quite different objectives to those of creditors who will absorb the cost of bank 
bankruptcy, 29  independently or in addition to any taxpayer costs. Secondly, adverse 
compensation incentives made bank employees aggressive risk seekers. Thirdly, complexity was 
a very strong barrier for shareholders or creditors who would be willing to exercise market 
discipline.30 Fourthly, lax capital regulations and lack of leverage checks, created incentives to 
massively expand bank balance sheets through reckless lending,31 not just in order to inflate 
profits and pay packages but also for job retention and career advancement purposes.32 The 
cumulative impact of agency problems, complexity, and herding was that TBTF multifunctional 
                                                
28 See E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets, the Law, the Economics, the Politics 
(CUP, 2012), chapters 2 and 3. 
 
29 A. Admati and M. Hellwig, “The Leverage Ratchet Effect”, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at 
Stanford University Working Paper 146, June 2013, available at 
www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research/documents/Leverage%20Ratchet%20Effect.pdf. 
 
30 E. Avgouleas and J. Cullen, “Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial 
Stability Costs of a Symbiotic Relationship”, 20(2) Columbia Journal of European Law, 2014/5, 
forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412869. 
 
31 See Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, “An accident waiting to happen”: The failure of 
HBOS, Fourth Report of Session 2012–13 HL Paper 144, HC 705, 4 April 2013, paras 28, 30, 39. 
[Hereinafter, Parliamentary Report 2013]. 
 
32 Avgouleas and Cullen, Excessive Leverage (2014/5). 
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banks eventually became, apart from a systemic threat, a serious financial system governance 
and integrity risk. 
Management’s and shareholders’ opportunistic behavior and a marked shift in 
organizational ethics and culture, which degraded the role of proper risk controls and risk 
divisions within the bank,33 and inherent complexity within the multifunctional bank business 
model eventually meant that TBTF multifunctional banks became very hard to manage34 and 
regulate. This assumption explains why TBTF (multifunctional) banks have been at the heart of 
most contemporary financial scandals, whether it is with respect to rotten advice given to 
consumers and investors in the context of the subprime crash or the LIBOR35 and Forex markets’ 
ringing36 or alleged money laundering37. 
                                                
33 The Parliamentary Report on the failure of the HBOS characteristically notes: “The risk function in 
HBOS was a cardinal area of weakness in the bank…” The degradation of the risk function was an 
important factor in explaining why the high-risk activities of the Corporate, International, and Treasury 
Divisions were not properly analyzed or checked at the highest levels within the bank. (Para 64). The 
weaknesses of group risk in HBOS were “a matter of design, not accident… (Para 65)” (emphasis added). 
Parliamentary Report 2013, supra note 31. 
34 Ibid. at Para 53. 
35 See “The LIBOR scandal: The rotten heart of finance – A scandal over key interest rates is about to go 
global”, The Economist 7 July 2012, available at www.economist.com/node/21558281; Kristen Dooley, 
“The LIBOR Scandal”, note in 32 Review of Banking and Financial Law 2–12 (2013), available at 
www.bu.edu/rbfl/files/2013/09/The-LIBOR-Scandal.pdf. 
36 “Foreign exchange allegations ‘as bad as Libor’, says regulator”, BBC, 4 February 2014, quoting 
Martin Wheatley, the head of the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority, available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26041039. See also J. McGeever, “TIMELINE-The FX ‘fixing’ scandal”, 
Reuters, 31 March 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/swiss-forex-investigation-
events-idUKL6N0M71KO20140331; J. Moore, “RBS boss warns Forex scandal could be bigger than 





The trend toward homogeneization, on the other hand, had two potent sources. The first 
was capital regulations, which provided ample opportunity for regulatory arbitrage inducing 
symmetric (gaming) behavior by big banks to minimize capital retention. The second was the use 
of similar risk measurements and risk mitigation techniques, the latter also based on Basel 
standards.38 The cumulative effect of regulatory and industry harmonization of capital and risk 
measurement techniques was homogenization of different business divisions’ income streams, 
which became dependent on the same markets (e.g., housing) even if the markets and the 
products sold were much different (e.g., cash mortgages, ABS, CDOs, or CDSs over the ABS).39 
Eventually, all multifunctional banks adopted a “follow the leader” strategy,40 making them very 
vulnerable to the first change in the financial winds in 2007, that is, the subprime mortgage crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
37 United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial 
System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing Risks – Senate Subcommittee Holds Hearing 
and Releases Report”, Monday, 16 July 2012, available at 
www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-
laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks. The outcome of the investigation was reported by the BBC as 
follows: “HSBC to pay $1.9bn in US money laundering penalties”, BBC, 11 December 2012, available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20673466. For similar incidents see J. Schneider, “FBI Says Cartel Used 
Bank of America to Launder Money”, Bloomberg, 9 July 2012, available at 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012–07–09/fbi-says-cartel-used-bank-of-america-to-launder-money.html. 
 
38 K. Alexander, J. Eatwell, A. Persaud and R. Reoch, “Financial Supervision and Crisis Management in 
the EU”, Study for the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Brussels, 
Dece. 2007, sections 1 and 2. 
 
39 Parliamentary Report 2013, supra note 31, Pars 42–43. 
 
40 A. G. Haldane, “Rethinking the Financial Network”, Speech to the Financial Student Association, 
Amsterdam, 28 April 2009, pp. 3–4, available at www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf. 
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A third explanation is a shift in the culture and ethics of the industry41 that was possibly 
due to the “contamination” of big commercial banks by the operating and management style of 
investment banks that led to weakened risk management controls and a persistent focus on 
ROE.42 Not a direct consequence of conglomeration but indicative of the casual attitude to risk 
that it created was the excessive use by banks of asset securitization and the adoption of the 
hazardous originate-to-distribute model, which meant that megabanks were the principal 
promoters of subprime mortgages and the key drivers behind their growth to disastrous levels.43 
The notion that risk could be endlessly diversified through “originate-to-distribute” led to a 
serious relaxation of credit risk controls by originator banks.44 
Apart from the havoc wreaked on global financial stability and economic welfare by 
badly shaken TBTF banks during the 2008 turmoil, another major welfare loss that may be 
attributed to conglomeration is that the financial system did not innovate in a way that would 
enhance growth and manage household risks. Instead financial innovation was driven by tax and 
regulatory arbitrage and obfuscated bank balance sheets undermining market discipline and 
                                                
41 The terrible fall in standards of customer care and the unethical behavior associated with recent banking 
scandals like Libor are very well documented in the Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, “Changing banking for good”, Vol. II, HL Paper 27-II HC 175-II, 19 June 2013. 
 
42 For a discussion of the impact of this shift in cultural attitudes in the banking industry see in this 
volume W. Blair, “Reconceptualizing the Role of Standards in Supporting Financial Regulation”, this 
volume, Chapter 21; R. Buckley, “The Changing Nature of Banking and Why it Matters”, this volume, 
Chapter 2. 
 
43 Wilmarth, supra note 17, pp. 1017–1022. 
 
44 E. Avgouleas, “The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search 
of a new Orthodoxy”, (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 121. 
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regulatory monitoring. Thus, it increased risk, which was warehoused in opaque parts of the 
system, and within large multifunctional banks.45 
Having more or less explained the rationale for size and conglomeration in banking 
markets I turn now to examine whether such arguments hold true on the basis of economic 
theory (economics of the bank industrial organization) and empirical studies. 
C Economics of Industrial Organization and the TBTF Bank 
Saunders and Walter note that, on the basis industrial economics theory, “the structural form of 
firms pursuing economic activity should follow the dictates of institutional comparative 
advantage. If there are significant economies of scale that can be exploited, it will be reflected in 
firm size”.46 If there are significant economies of scope that can be exploited – either in terms of 
costs or revenues – it will be reflected in the range of activities in which successful firms are 
engaged. In principle, if productive linkages can be built across geographies or client segments 
or business lines, it too will be reflected in the breadth and geographic scope of the underlying 
drivers of the structure of financial intermediaries.47 Namely, in a pure market-driven context, 
optimum institutional structure is driven by the production functions of financial intermediaries, 
on the one hand, and preference functions of end users, on the other. Thus, in theory, distortions 
                                                
45 See E. Avgouleas, “Regulating Financial Innovation: A Multifaceted Challenge to Financial Stability, 
Consumer Protection, and Growth” in E. Ferran, N. Moloney, J Payne (eds) Oxford Handbook on 
Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2015) chapter 23, forthcoming. 
 
46 A. Saunders and I. Walter, “Financial Architecture, Systemic Risk, and Universal Banking”, 26 Fin. 
Markets and Portfolio Mgt 39–59 (2012), p. 48. 
 
47 Ibid. pp. 41–49. 
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in markets for financial intermediation in the form of taxes, explicit or implicit subsidies, and 
regulatory constraints will alter structural optimization and create efficiency losses in the 
financial system.48 
(i) Building Size: The Economies of Scale Assumption 
In terms of revealed preferences banks present a paradox compared to other forms of business 
organization: they prefer to combine many different activities instead of focusing on 
maximization of competitive advantage. This paradox also distinguishes banks from other 
financial services firms, for, example nonbanking financial institutions like mutual funds and 
finance companies. The latter often choose to specialize and therefore are much more transparent. 
Adjusting for scale and operating efficiency the range of activities engaged in by financial 
intermediaries can have both cost and revenue benefits.49 Sources of scale and scope economies 
include the following: 
i. Information technology-related economies 
ii. Reputation and marketing/brand name-related benefits 
iii. (Financial) Innovation-related economies 
iv. Diversification benefits50 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Ibid. p. 50. 
 
50 A. Boot, “Restructuring in the Banking Industry with Implications for Europe” in 8(1) 2003 EIB Papers 
(Europe’s Changing Financial Landscape: Recent Developments and Prospects), 108, pp. 110 et seq. 
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Information technology-related economies particularly refer to back-office efficiencies and 
distribution network-related benefits, at the same time transaction processing offers distinct scale 
economies. Information technology developments facilitate an increasing array of financial 
products and services to be offered through the same distribution network, and thus allow for 
cross selling.51 Reputation and brand name or marketing-related economies might be present in 
the joint marketing of products to customers.52 
On the basis of the foregone discussion, economies of scale within financial 
conglomerates should have been an undisputable fact. Yet the empirical evidence is as 
contradictory as the theoretical literature is straightforward.53 Scale and scope economies in 
banking have been studied extensively. In general, studies are divided into those which are 
agnostic, 54  strongly positive, or strongly negative. The result of earlier studies was that 
economies of scale were exhausted at relatively small-size banks (under ten billion USD in 







54 A. N. Berger, R. S. Demsetz and P. E. Strahan, “The Consolidation of the financial Services Industry: 
Causes, Consequences and Implications for the Future”, 23 Journal of Banking and Finance 135–194 
(1999), concluded that, in general, the empirical evidence cannot readily identify substantial economies of 




assets).55 Yet more recent studies point at more persistent scale economies. Wheelock and 
Wilson (2009)56 and Feng and Serletis (2010)57 find increasing returns to scale. 
These more recent studies use a different methodology, correcting to some extent 
possible flaws in earlier studies, 58  but more importantly they utilize more advanced IT 
technology and wider availability of data, given how much more transparent banks have become 
since 2008. This is important because it is unclear if earlier researchers had access to information 
about efficiencies and profitability of individual business division within banks, figures that all 
big bank management prefers to obfuscate. To this effect, and challenging earlier assumptions, 
the most recent studies show that size in banking is linked to economies of scale in a variety of 
contexts59 and especially improves banks operating costs, understood as noninterest costs like 
                                                
55 For an excellent discussion of these studies see Boot, supra note 50, pp. 23–26. 
56 D. C Wheelock and P. Wilson, “Are U.S. Banks Too Large?”, Working Paper 2009–054 (2009), 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
57 G. Feng and A. Serletis, “Efficiency, Technical Change, and Returns to Scale in Large US Banks: Panel 
Data Evidence from an Output Distance Function Satisfying Theoretical Regularity”, 34 Journal of 
Banking and Finance 127–138 (2010). 
 
58 E.g., L. J. Mester, “Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform”, Note in: The 
Region. Federal Reserve of Minneapolis, Sept. 2010, available at 
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4535 
 
59 J. Hughes and L. Mester, “Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from 
a Risk-Return- Driven Cost Function”, 22 Journal of Financial Intermediation 559–85 (2013); D. C. 
Wheelock and P. W. Wilson, “Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale 




employee remuneration, cost of premises, IT infrastructure etc. 60  Naturally, evidence of 
economies of scale is higher in efficiently run versus inefficient banks,61 exhibiting the value of 
good and sensible management. 
(ii) Conglomeration and Economies of Scope 
Unlike most success stories in financial services where focus tends to reap supracompetitive 
rewards, for example, Goldman Sachs, Euroclear, Blackstone, banks tend to diversify the scope 
of their activities. As explained earlier, this is in part in order to diversify sources of income. But 
this is not the only purpose. In the period before 2008 it was consistently argued that 
conglomeration in the financial sector was motivated by and presented distinct economies of 
scope. According to Saunders and Walter, “revenue economies of scope in financial 
intermediation arise when the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single 
supplier is less than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes search, 
                                                
60 It is suggested that quantitatively a 10 per cent increase in assets is associated with 0.3 to 0.6 per cent 
decline in noninterest expense scaled by income or assets, depending on specification. A. Kovner, J. 
Vickery and L. Zhou, “Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?”, 20(2) Federal Reserve Bank of 
Economic Policy Review, March 2014, 1–44, pp. 221–22. The authors of the aforementioned study have 
found evidence that lower operating costs are a source of scale economies because large banks spread 
overheads associated with IT and accounting systems and marketing over a larger asset or revenue base. 
Id. pp. 2, 12–18, 21 with extensive tables. It is the present author’s view that such detailed studies would 
not have been possible to prior to 2008. In addition the authors of the aforementioned study are 
researchers based in the NY Fed, which means they had access to an extensive range of unpublished 
(nonconfidential) data than authors of earlier studies. 
 




monitoring, and contracting costs”.62 Financial intermediaries that are diversified could achieve 
cost reductions by cross-selling as well as selling a broader rather than narrower range of 
products. At the same time, shared IT platforms, client database, branch networks, as well as data 
mining constitute a fixed cost that be spread better in a bigger organization. 
Accordingly, like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly 
observable in production functions of financial services suppliers and in aggregate performance 
measures.63 Yet, unlike the mixed to positive picture offered by the aforementioned studies on 
the relationship between bank size and economies of scale, most empirical studies64 have failed 
to find significant cost economies of scope in the banking, insurance or securities industries. On 
the contrary, there is evidence of diseconomies of scope, which emanate from three sources: new 
product costs, 65  the diversification discount, 66  and organization complexity that leads to 
inefficient management and regulatory supervision. 
Significant cost-scope economies or diseconomies should be reflected on investor 
valuations of financial intermediaries and these valuations should, in principle, be an important 
                                                




64 For a very comprehensive overview of these studies see Boot, supra note 50, pp. 24–26. 
 
65 For example, it has been observed that when financial services firms add new product lines and the 
product range widens, unit-costs seem to go up and not down. Ibid. 
 
66 The most common meaning of this term is that due to conglomerate’s opaque balance sheets and 
complex business activities capital markets value the whole of the business less than the sum of its parts. 
This is in line with corporate finance theory that tells us that investors can choose to diversify and that 
this does not need to be done at the firm level. 
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factor (alongside financial stability and consumer welfare) in choosing optimal institutional 
structures in banking. Yet a strong line of studies point to the opposite direction revealing the 
existence of a persistent discount in valuations of financial conglomerates. The more recent 
studies, starting with Laeven and Levine (2007)67 confirm the existence of a diversification 
discount in banks that combine lending and nonlending financial services, mostly reflecting 
potential agency problems and inefficiencies associated with cross-subsidies. Schmid and Walter 
(2009)68 confirm the Laeven and Levine (2007) results, and verify that this discount is indeed 
caused by diversification, and not by inefficiencies that already existed before the 
diversification.69 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)70 showed that the interrelation between activities 
within the conglomerate is of crucial importance. Diversified firms can trade at a premium if the 
dispersion between activities is low. High dispersion induces inefficiencies, which add credence 
to the hypothesis that focus adds value to the business of banking. Evidence from capital markets’ 
reaction to financial sector mergers reinforces this view. DeLong (2001) examined shareholder 
                                                
67 L. Laeven and R. Levine, “Is There a Diversification Discount in Financial Conglomerates?”, 85 
Journal of Financial Economics 331–367 (2007). 
 
68 M. M. Schmid and I. Walter, “Do Financial Conglomerates Create or Destroy Economic Value?” 18 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 193–216 (2009). 
 
69 Both studies, using large data panels, have attempted to ascertain whether or not functional 
diversification is value enhancing or value destroying in the financial services sector and estimate the 
value-reduction effect at about 20%. Ibid. 
 
70 R. Rajan, H. Servaes and L. Zingales, “The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and 
Inefficient Investment”, 55 Journal of Finance 35–80 (2000). 
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gains from focused versus diversifying bank mergers in the United States between 1988 and 
1995.71 Focused mergers, in terms of kind of activity undertaken by the merger firms and 
geographic dispersion, were found to result in a positive effect on the immediate 
postannouncement share prices. Activity- diversifying mergers had no positive announcement 
effects.72 
The consequences of the rise in agency costs in financial conglomerates have been 
evident in the already discussed Libor, FX rigging, and money-laundering scandals. Impossible 
to manage and too complex to regulate banking conglomerates turned into a constant integrity 
and efficiency risk for the financial system. While the spotlight has fallen on rotten cultures and 
ethics within the “chastened” banks, banking conglomerates were likely to encounter several of 
the revealed abuses, even in the absence of infractions of ethical standards. Simply put, the 
broader the range of financial firm activities, in the presence of imperfect information, the 
greater the probability that the firm will encounter conflicts of interest. 
Agency costs due to complexity that conglomeration brings means that sooner or later 
business lines’ diversification will destroy shareholder and franchise value through a marked rise 
in agency costs and inefficient use of capital. Namely, conglomerates tend to use capital 
inefficiently and this is independently of the colossal conduct costs that the scandals discussed 
earlier brought about in the form of payment billions of dollars in regulatory fines and other 
                                                
71 G. DeLong, “Stockholder Gains from Focusing versus Diversifying Bank Mergers”, 59 Journal of 
Financial Economics 221–242 (2001). 
 





sanctions.73 Managerial discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-subsidization of 
marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy businesses, misalignments in 
incentives between central and divisional managers seem to be as responsible.74 In addition, as 
Boot75 accurately argues that conglomeration proved an excellent technique to bury trade-related 
losses in the group balance sheet and it was, thus, mostly favored by senior bank management 
that came from the investment banking side.76 
These findings make shareholder preference for conglomeration, or, at least, no resistance 
to, it even more puzzling. I argue that there is a twofold explanation for this seeming departure 
from shareholder self-interest maximization. First, conglomeration renders the biggest parts of 
the financial group TBTF, incentivizing, thus, shareholders to seek leverage and take advantage 
of the TBTF subsidy. Secondly shareholder preference for/nonresistance to conglomeration in 
the financial sector may be evidence of the prevalence of bounded rationality even within 
sophisticated capital market actors. 
                                                
73 A very good study by the LSE Bank conduct costs project run by R. McCormick has indicated that 
conduct costs for the ten world-leading banks in the period between 2008–2012 have neared 150 billion 
GBP. See for the requisite table the period between 2008–2012 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/conductcosts/bank-
conduct-costs-results/. 
 
74 P. G. Berger, E. Ofek, “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value”, 37 Journal of Financial Economics 
39–65 (1995). 
 
The bulk of value erosion in conglomerates is usually attributed to overinvestment in marginally 
profitable activities and cross-subsidization. Id. 
 
75 Boot, supra note 50, pp. 16–20. 
 
76 In the present author’s view Bob Diamond’s ascent to the top of Barclays PLC is only one instance of 
proven domination of senior management jobs in big universal banks by investment bankers in the 2000s. 
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D The TBTF Subsidy and Bank Competition 
(i) Evidence of the TBTF Subsidy 
In general, big systemic banks, so-called too-big-to-fail banks enjoy a strong advantage in terms 
of costs of funding, which smaller institutions do not. There have been numerous quantitative 
studies of the “subsidy” provided by the implicit government bail-out guarantee to the larger 
banks that are too-big-to-fail. The first in a line of several such studies was by Andy Haldane 
who made the bold claim that direct and indirect state subsidies to big banks amounted to 25 
percent of world GDP.77 This was followed by several others providing similar conclusions, for 
example, Ueda and Weder-Di Mauro, 201178; Li et al. 2011, 79 with the latest authoritative study 
finding that the funding discount enjoyed by TBTF banks could rise to as high as (-)1.21 percent 
(Santos, 201480). The TBTF funding subsidy constitutes a clear distortion of competition. 
                                                
77 A. G. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size”, Institute of Economic Affairs, 21 Beesley Lecture, 25 
October 2012, p. 4 et seq., available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech615.pdf  In fact, Haldane 
argues that any economies of scale in TBTF banks comes due to the funding advantage ensured by the 
TBTF subsidy. However, the Kovner et al. study cited in note 57 earlier, which found strong evidence of 
economies of scale in big banks, measured noninterest operating costs. 
 
78 K. Ueda and B. Weder Di Mauro, “Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions”, IMF Working Paper 12/128, (2011). 
 
79 Z. Li, S. Qu and J. Zhang, “Quantifying the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees for Large 
Financial Institutions. Moody’s Analytics Quantitative Research Group”, (January 2013). 
 
80 See J. Santos, “Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Subsidy”, 20 Federal 




Taking advantage of lower funding costs, larger banks can cut margins aggressively, 
offering new clients better lending terms, to edge out smaller competitors (Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2011),81 a clear distortion in terms of playing field. Yet it is unclear if this is the sole or even the 
main reason for the very high levels of concentration experienced by banking markets in most 
major economies where banking products and services are offered by a small group of very large 
banks. Thus, I provide below a more in-depth analysis of issues of competition in the banking 
sector. 
(ii) Bank Competition and Systemic Stability: How Much Competition Is Too Much? 
As explained earlier, the banking industry has been building size for at least two decades and the 
recent forced mergers and acquisitions, in order to avoid bank collapses, have only intensified 
this phenomenon. It is, however, unclear whether banking markets present highly oligopolistic 
structures because banking is an industry that offers its services more efficiently through large-
size institutions, or because regulatory controls and licensing requirements are so expensive as to 
deter new entrants from entering the market, especially in the market for retail banking services 
where the margins for profit can be quite low. 
There are two basic hypotheses in the literature on the relationship between financial 
stability and competition: the franchise value paradigm (competition-fragility view) and the risk-
shifting hypothesis (competition-stability view).82 The competition- fragility view contends that 
                                                
81 R. Gropp, H. Hakenes, and I. Schnabel, “Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies”, 24 
Review of Financial Studies 2084–2120 (2011). 
 
82 For analytical discussion of the two hypotheses see M. López-Puertas Lamy, “Commercial banks 
versus Stakeholder banks: Same business, same risks, same rules?”, mimeo, 2012, pp. 3–6, available at 
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an increase in competition will hurt bank stability by eroding the franchise value.83 Based on 
empirical findings and theoretical simulations these studies postulate that less competitive 
banking systems are less fragile because the numerous lending opportunities, high profits, capital 
ratios, and charter values of incumbent banks make them better placed to withstand demand- or 
supply-side shocks, and provide disincentives for excessive risk taking.84 
The competition-stability view holds that competition leads to less fragility, because the 
market power of banks results in higher interest rates for customers, making it more difficult for 
them to repay loans.85 The market power of banks results in higher interest rates for customers, 
making it more difficult for them to repay loans, increasing the possibility of loan default and 
increasing risk for bank portfolios, making the financial system less stable.86 
Most recently, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) suggest a nonlinear relationship 
between bank competition and financial stability, arguing that heightened competition may 
reduce a borrower’s probability of default (referred to as the risk-shifting effect), but it may also 
reduce interest payments from performing loans, which serve as a buffer to cover loan losses 
(referred to as the margin effect). They find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between 




83 F. Allen and D. Gale, “Competition and Financial Stability”, 36 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
453–480 (2004); E. Carletti, “Competition and Regulation in Banking” in A Boot, A Thakor, (eds.) 
Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), chapter 14. 
84 Ibid. 
 





competition (measured by the number of banks) and bank stability. In highly concentrated 
markets, the risk-shifting effect dominates and more competition reduces bank risk, while in very 
competitive markets the margin effect dominates, and increased competition erodes bank 
franchise value and hence increases risk.87 
Overall empirical evidence with respect to whether competition enhances or reduces bank 
stability is mixed. While some researchers find that the risk of bank failure increases in less 
competitive markets,88 others find that risk decreases with a rise in the market power of 
incumbent banks.89 Berger et al. (2009), using a variety of risk and competition measures from 
twenty-three countries, provide limited support to both the competition-fragility and 
competition-stability views.90 Specifically, they find that market power increases credit risk, but 
banks with more market power face less risk, overall, which also is in accord with the 
conclusions of the Jimenez et al. study. 
                                                
87 D. Martinez-Miera, R. Repullo, “Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?”, CEPR 
Working Paper DP6669/2009. 
 
88 See J. H Boyd and G. De Nicoló, “The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited”, 60 
Journal of Finance 1329–1343 (2005); J. Boyd, G. De Nicoló, A. Al Jalal, “Bank risk taking and 
competition revisited: New theory and new evidence”, mimeo, Carlson School of Management, 
University of Minnesota, 2006. 
 
89 G. Jiménez, J. A. López and J. Saurina, “How does competition impact bank risk taking?” Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Woking Paper 2007–23, Sept. 2007, available at 
www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07–23bk.pdf. 
 
90 A. N. Berger, L. F. Klapper, R. Turk-Ariss, “Bank competition and financial stability”, 35Journal of 
Financial Services Research 99–118 (2009). 
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The view that “too much” competition could undermine instead of fostering financial 
stability is clearly upheld by IMF experts:91 “Limited competition and strong regulation, which 
limits banking activities and requires banks to have more equity (i.e., shareholder funds) and 
more secure investments, can lead to a more secure banking system”. 
Ratnovski accurately postulates that this is due to problems of corporate governance. 
Shareholders face inverse incentives, as they normally wish to pursue profitability at the expense 
of safety and creditors, turning thus into weak corporate monitors.92 Moreover, complexity of 
bank business provides yet another obstacle to strengthening shareholders’ role as monitors93 and 
it may be also an obstacle to shareholders’ pushing for more competition if they do not have an 
accurate picture of which part of the bank’s business has the highest potential. 
Experience shows that Canada and Australia, which were among the least-affected 
countries by the GFC, were dominated by very few big banks, due to previous crises and older 
rounds of baking sector consolidation, which increased bank resilience.94 It is disputed, however, 
                                                
91 L. Ratnovski, “Competition Policy for Modern Banks”’, International Monetary Fund, WP/13/126, 




93 See also Avgouleas and Cullen, supra note 7. 
 
94 N. Arjani and G. Paulin, “Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Bank Performance and Regulatory 
Reform”, Bank of Canada Discussion Paper 2013–4 December 2013, pp. 1–5. Others, on the other hand, 
like ex IMF chief economist Simon Johnson argue that Canadian banks were more undercapitalized and 
leveraged than U.S. banks and what made them more stable was the fact that Canadian banks paid a very 
low premium to have their mortgages insured by the federal government. Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, 




that these oligopolies made markets less competitive especially when it came to pricing 
consumer products. For example, a 2013 IMF paper on the matter shows Australia and Canada 
presenting medium intensity levels of competition.95 
But these observations ought not to be taken too far and up to the point that consumer 
welfare is detrimentally affected. They just mean that measures to increase competition in 
banking presuppose that the banking system is already robust to ameliorate any systemic stability 
impact that enhanced competition may have. As explained in the Vickers Report the banking 
industry in the United Kingdom (and in other countries) presents higher levels of concentration 
after the crisis than before, given the merger of major commercial banks in the aftermath of the 
crisis (e.g., Lloyds Bank with Halifax Bank of Scotland).96 This ought to be a matter of concern 
for regulators because the concentration of retail accounts has reached such a level as to restrict 
consumer choice.97 More recently, the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority 
has conducted a review of the industry and reached some “damning” conclusions.98 CMA is now 
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96 Independent Commission on Banking, “Final Report – Recommendations”, September 2011, p. 16–18 
and chapters 6–8, available at https://hmt-
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97 Ibid. pp. 154–156. 
 
98 The CMA found that: “Essential parts of the UK retail banking sector lack effective competition and do 
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moving toward a “root and branch” review of the conditions of competition in the UK banking 
industry.99 
(iii) Capital Structure “Optimization” and Excessive Leverage 
There is ample evidence to show that funding advantages allowed TBTF institutions to expand 
their balance sheets through leverage and there is sufficient evidence to show that too-big-to-fail 
banks are prone to take much riskier assets than other banks.100 It is, however, unclear whether in 
the absence of leverage restrictions, elimination of TBTF subsidy will radically alter bank 
management behavior. While Admati, Hellwig, and others101 accurately point out that bankers 
are addicted to leverage and they have also overlooked an important element. Shareholder 
pressure on bank management to build leverage and thus maximize ROE may be the only 
survival and career-advancement strategy even for the most prudent of bank managers if their 
competitors are doing the same. I have written on this matter elsewhere102 and the discussion has 
                                                




100 G. Afonso, J. Santos, J. Traina, “Do ‘Too Big To Fail’ Banks Take on More Risk?”, 20 Federal 
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Banks; M. Brandao, L., R. Correa, and H. Sapriza. 2013. “International Evidence on Government Support 
and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector”, International Monetary Fund Working Paper no. 13/94. 
 
101 Admati and Hellwig, supra note 29. 
 
102 Avgouleas and Cullen, Excessive Leverage (2014/5). 
35 
 
been upheld and furthered by the Financial Times in a recent editorial,103 so no more will be said 
here. 
E Was Glass Steagall Successful? 
While the arguments of its critics proved to have shaky foundations, the financial stability 
benefits of Glass Steagall have been beyond much doubt. Apart from the crisis in the Savings & 
Loans sector of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which saw 747 thrift failures (out of 3,234)104 but 
did not in the end infect systemic financial institutions covered by the Act, the U.S. financial 
sector suffered no major crisis during the life the Act. During the same period the United States 
saw the failure of only one systemic institution, the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust 
Company in 1984. 
At the same time, it is hypothesized that the Act, by adding focus, which led to creating 
high level skills and impetus in the search of new revenues, was, in part, responsible for the 
progressive dominance of U.S. investment banks in rapidly evolving offshore and onshore 
capital markets worldwide. The gradual liberalization and integration of global markets since the 
1970s also meant that American securities firms progressively dominated the competitiveness 
tables edging out European universal banking behemoths and their Asian counterparts, which 
                                                
103 M. Arnold, “Tale of Two Banks Exposes Pay as Wrong Target of Critics – UK’s Co-op is opposite 
extreme to Wells Fargo of US”, FT, 14 April 2014, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9a41d96-c3e1–
11e3-a8e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3C5WYTP7K. 
 
104 Saunders and Walter (2011), p. 43–45. 
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had traditionally enjoyed intimate relationships with domestic corporates and governments.105 
Glass Stegall is also credited the impetus for the development of “global buy-side” markets, 
comprising insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional investors, by U.S. 
investment banks that provided buy-side participants with new investment alternatives. It is 
validly assumed that had Glass Steagall not been in place after 1933, the lack of competitive 
pressure would have affected the global competitiveness and drive to innovate that U.S. 
investment banks subsequently showed, especially after the mid-1970s. 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that the true impetus to amend and eventually repeal the Act 
did not come from the SEC regulated broker-dealer sector but rather it was the through pressure 
by large U.S. commercial banks106 whose participation in global capital markets and especially 
in the lucrative securities underwriting market was restricted even after the 1956 amendments, 
which allowed commercial banks to maintain a limited purpose securities subsidiary. 
Commercial banks, which already competed “vigorously with investment banks in government 
bond, foreign exchange, and other traded markets as well as corporate advisories” argued that 
Glass Steagall restrictions on their securities activities placed them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Namely, the principal factor behind the disastrous repeal of Glass Steagall was greedy 
commercial bank shareholders rather than a nepharious Wall Street conspiracy. 
                                                
105 Ibid. Saunders and Walter accurately note: “By the early 1990s American investment banks basically 
dominated their industry worldwide, with a market share approaching 75% in terms of transactions 
volume. As a consequence, investment banking developed into one of the top U.S. export industries”. Id. 
 
106 Saunders and Walter name as the principal agitators Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Bankers Trust, 
Chase Manhattan and Citicorp. Saunders and Walter (2011), pp. 45–47. 
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F Summary of Findings 
The presence of significant economies of scale associated with bank size are not a sufficient 
reason to allow banks to expand their balance sheets, normally though leverage, to the point that 
they threaten financial stability. But even if there is a trade-off between efficiencies-driven bank 
size and financial stability, the studies discussed earlier showed no evidence of any efficiencies 
attained through conglomeration. On the contrary, as Glass Steagall’s impact on the 
competiveness of the U.S. investment banking sector and the examples of important financial 
services firms like Blackrock, Euroclear, and large hedge funds have shown, focus pays off in 
banking as in most other industries. In contrast, conglomeration, in the name of unproved income 
diversification, seems to bring intolerable costs. These include the diversification discount and 
over-stretching management and regulatory ability to the point that universal bank behemoths 
become a constant social and financial stability risk. 
Moreover, all evidence points to the direction that systemic risk cannot be contained in 
large diversified banks. On the contrary a number of studies, e.g., Richardson, Smith, and Walter 
(2010)107 conclude that “expansion to multiple functions – the LCFI (large, complex financial 
institution) model – produces greater systematic risk”.108 Their conclusion echoes an extensive 
line of studies pointing to the same direction, including more recently De Jonghe (2010)109 and 
                                                
107 M. Richardson, R.C. Smith and I. Walter, “Large Banks and the Volcker Rule” in V. Acharya et al. 
(eds.), Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance (Willey, 
2010), 181–212. 
108 Ibid. 
109 O. De Jonghe, “Back to the Basics in Banking? A Micro-Analysis of Banking System Stability”, 19 
Journal of Financial Intermediation (2010) 387–417. 
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theoretical work by Wagner (2010).110 It follows that, in the absence, of any strong evidence in 
favour of conglomeration, structural reform is a good way to respond to interconnectedness in 
financial markets. This is an issue that I will further discuss in the next section. 
IV Dealing with the TBTF Bank 
A Special Resolution Regimes and Structural Reform 
Implementation of special resolution schemes and structural reform rather than enhanced 
competition have been the main prongs of government and regulators’ approach to resolving the 
TBTF problem. Special resolution regimes for financial institutions, in general, as is the case 
with the EU Bank Resolution Directive, or just for systemically important institutions, as is the 
case with the Dodd Frank OLA, target TBTF moral hazard from two very important routes. 
First, by removing legal obstacles to resolution, by means of derogation from general 
company and insolvency law safeguards and procedures, and by minimizing the risk of 
contagion, special resolution regimes purportedly secure the orderly failure of a TBTF bank, 
without damaging confidence in the financial system or disrupting the provision of essential 
payment and other services by the failing institution. Secondly, through the use of bail-in clauses, 
special resolution regimes attempt to force TBTF bank funders (shareholders & creditors) to 
internalize the risk of failure of systemic banks,111 namely, to curb the externalities caused by 
                                                
110 W.Wagner, “Diversification at Financial Institutions and Systemic Crises”, 19 Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 373–386 (2010). 
111 One of the Act’s explicit aims, as stated in its preamble, is: “to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts”. Thus, under section 204(a) (1) of the Dodd Frank Act creditors and shareholders bear all 
the losses of the financial company that has entered OLA. 
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risk-seeking banks. It is expected that such bail-in regimes will make bank shareholders and 
more importantly creditors better corporate monitors minimizing excessive risk seeking.112 
Structural reform, on the other hand, has, in general, taken two forms. First, the Vickers 
model that seeks to both shelter (ring-fence) the commercial banking part of the group from risks 
arising in the investment banking part of the group and battle interconnectedness, due to 
limitations it imposes on the activities the ring-fenced bank can undertake.113 The commercial 
banking subsidiary will remain part of the group subject to strict corporate governance 
safeguards. The second model (the Volcker Rule) amounts to an outright restriction on licensed 
commercial bank groups to engage in proprietary trading and shadow banking activities, namely, 
the riskiest parts of investment banking business. Thus, the Volcker Rule (s. 619 of the Dodd 
Frank Act) includes a ban on “proprietary trading” and “investing” and “sponsoring” a “covered 
fund”, a term that extends to a variety of shadow banking vehicles and beyond. A banking entity 
“invests” in a “covered fund” if it acquires or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership 
interest in a hedge fund or a private equity fund. 
Both Volcker rule and Vickers separation models present some distinct advantages when 
it comes to battling interconnectedness. In addition, revised Basel capital and liquidity 
                                                
112 See T. F. Huertas, “The Case for Bail-ins”, chapter in A. Dombrt and P. Kenadjian, The Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (Berlin, De Gruyter, e-book, 2013). For some scepticism as to the 
possible adverse effects of triggering the bail-in process E. Avgouleas and C. Goodhart, “A Critical 
Evaluation of Bails as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms”, CEPR, DP 10015/14, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478647. 
 
113 The best example is the UK’s new ring fencing regime based on the recommendation of the Vickers 
Report which were implemented by means of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33. 
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requirements are bound to add further resilience and insert a more long-term perspective in the 
funding sources of commercial banks. 
Yet structural reform may not resolve, on its own, the TBTF conundrum. While structural 
separation of different forms of banking is essential for financial stability yet the optimum model 
is rather elusive. For example, both the Vickers and Volcker models of structural separation are 
characteristically discomforted by the most challenging part of banking: wholesale lending. Also 
the circumstances surrounding the already discussed repeal of Glass Steagall and the EU “level 
the playing field” legislation have shown how vulnerable is structural legislation to political 
economy risks. There is always the possibility that due to groupthink or regulatory capture, 
driven by industry self-interest, one day politicians will turn back the clock to recent structural 
reforms and conglomeration and financial stability risk will re-emerge. 
Finally, fractional reserve banking works on trust and any important endogenous or 
exogenous shock is capable of triggering a panic, in the absence of fiscal backstops. To this 
effect a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative full reserve banking 
and of the two best-known models of narrow/limited purpose banking, both proposed by 
prominent economists, is very apposite here. 
B Full Reserve Narrow/Limited Purpose Banking 
Chamley, Kotlikoff, and Polemarhakis have argued that “[b]anks collapse for one reason – they 
are leveraged. Hence, limiting proprietary information, that is, providing much more disclosure 
and transparency, and eliminating leverage are the key to having a stable, well- functioning 
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financial system”. 114  Thus Kotlikoff 115  and Chamley 116  have proposed a full reserve 
alternative.117 The essence of their proposal is that all limited liability financial intermediaries 
should be treated identically, regardless of organizational form. Namely, all commercial banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, private equity funds, credit unions would 
have to operate as mutual fund holding companies that issue 100 percent equity- financed open- 
and closed-end mutual funds. Total lack of leverage would mean that different institutions and 
the financial system as whole would never fail. Shadow banking vehicles will be allowed to 
                                                
114 C. Chamley, L. J. Kotlikoff, H. Polemarhakis, “Limited Purpose Banking – Moving from ‘Trust Me’ 
to ‘Show Me’ Banking”, mimeo May 2012, available at www.kotlikoff.net/content/limited-purpose-
banking-moving-trust-me-show-me-banking. 
 
115 L. J. Kotlikoff, Jimmy Stewart Is Dead: Ending the World’s Ongoing Financial Plague with Limited 
Purpose Banking (John Wiley and Sons, 2010). 
 
116 See C. Chamley and L. J. Kotlikoff, “Limited Purpose Banking – Putting An End to Financial Crises”, 
Financial Times, The Economists’ Forum, 27 January 2009, available at 
http://people.bu.edu/Kotlikoff/newweb/LimitedPurposeBanking1–27–09.pdf. 
 
117 Their proposal has been summarized as follows: 
1. All financial companies protected by limited liability can market just one thing – mutual funds. 
2. Mutual funds are not allowed to borrow, explicitly or implicitly, and, thus, can never fail. 
3. Cash mutual funds, which are permitted to hold only cash, are used for the payment system. 
4. Cash mutual funds are the only mutual funds backed to the buck. 
5. Tontine-type mutual funds are used to allocate idiosyncratic risk. 
6. Pari-mutuel mutual funds are used to allocate aggregate risk via direct or derivate betting. 
7. The Federal Financial Authority (FFA) hires private companies working only for it to verify,  
 appraise, rate, custody, and disclose, in real time, all securities held by mutual funds. 
8. Mutual funds buy and sell FFA-processed and disclosed securities at auction. This ensures that 
issuers of securities, be they households or firms, receive the highest price for their paper. 
Chamley et al. (2012). 
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carry leverage but as they would be unlimited liability entities, any losses would fall on their 
owners. 
Full reserve limited purpose banking is not without its own intractable problems. For 
example, how would full reserve limited purpose banks defend themselves from a depositor 
flight when competing “shadow banks” offer reasonable and safely higher interest, while they 
are themselves constrained to do so by the fact that their reserves would be fully invested in low 
yielding instruments? Moreover, not all “shadow banks” will be the same. What if imprudent 
depositors start chasing illusionary high returns from Chinese type investment trusts, rendering 
unregulated retail shadow banks the order of the day. Of course, Kotlikoff et al. note that shadow 
banking entities will have to be unlimited liability vehicles. However, this, in effect, means very 
little. Will regulators be able to check if owners’ equity is enough to cover the shadow banks’ 
liabilities? If yes then the “shadow banks” are now “regulated banks” in some jurisdictions. Then 
how are we supposed to avoid – disastrous in this case – regulatory arbitrage by shadow banks in 
the absence of a global regulatory system and a global regulator, which may be politically 
unfeasible for some time? 
Professor Kay has suggested a different form of full reserve narrow banking. This would 
involve the spinoff of big bank’s proprietary trading business, because this business differs only 
in scale from their treasury operations, which are both necessary and legitimate.118 As a result, 
Kay proposed a division between narrow banks accepting retail deposits, which should 
preferably be invested in risk-free government bonds and would only provide payment and other 
                                                
118 J. Kay, “Narrow Banking, The Reform of Banking Regulation”, Report for the Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation, September 2009, available at www.johnkay.com/papers/JK_NarrowBanking.pdf. 
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utility banking services and all other financial business. The latter could be deregulated and freed 
from microprudential regulation. 
Professor Kay’s model also presented intractable difficulties. First, under the Kay model 
most forms of lending that could create an asset bubble such as mortgage or big business lending
 
would be conducted by the unregulated or quasiregulated sector, perpetuating the risks that led to 
the global financial crisis,
 
such as the too-big-to-fail problem. 119 Also, leaving risky lending to 
the unregulated sector would mean that unequipped financing vehicles would have to assume 
risks that commercial banks are much better equipped to handle. 
Another loophole of Kay’s model is the constantly fluctuating state of sovereign bond 
markets. As the Asian and Eurozone crises have shown, these assets are as unsafe as any. In 
addition, there may be inadequate supply of such instruments to cover the entire stock of insured 
deposits in any given country, as is the case with the United Kingdom.120 
Arguably, there is no way around either problem, and Kay’s suggestion for the 
government to issue additional gilts to on-lend to narrow banks  “would essentially mean the 
nationalization” of credit risk. Finally, Kay’s model is even more vulnerable to unlicensed 
competitors (e.g., money market funds) offering higher interest rates to existing and potential 
depositors as the suggested narrow banks’ assets would attract the traditionally lower sovereign 
bond yields rather than the superior corporate bond interest rates. 
                                                
 
119 Kay suggested that funds for these activities would be raised from wholesale markets, securitisations 
and own capital, instead of retail deposits. Ibid. 
 
120 Financial Services Authority (FSA), “A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis: 
Systemically Important Banks and Assessing the Cumulative Impact”, Discussion Paper 09/4, October 
2009, pp. 23–24. 
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Yet, what is discussed earlier does not mean that the introduction of narrow banking 
vehicles, which combine both equity and debt financing through the capital markets, in parts of 
the financial system, would be out of place. On the contrary, especially when it comes to credit 
markets like mortgage lending, where leverage has a massive impact on the real economy, and a 
feedback effect on financial stability, due to the volatility of housing markets, if their rates were 
competitive, such narrow banking vehicles would remove a very substantial source of instability 
from the financial system. 
V Conclusion 
Saunders and Walter have observed that in a pure market context, optimum institutional structure 
in the financial sector should be driven by the production functions of financial intermediaries 
and the preferences of end users.121 In practice financial institutions become larger or smaller, 
broader or narrower than what is optimal for the intermediation tasks to be performed. This is 
mostly due to distortions in markets for financial intermediation in the form of taxes, explicit or 
implicit subsidies, and regulatory constraints.122 Two prominent such distortions are the TBTF 
subsidy and the preferential tax treatment of debt that affects the structure of bank capital.123 Lots 
of questions had been left unaddressed for a long time. Is bigger better? Is broader better? Both 
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questions have no easy answers. We need to consider them in the context of financial stability, 
client welfare, shareholder value, regulatory effectiveness, and oversocial utility. 
Issues of financial stability and consumer welfare ought to be addressed first. As 
explained earlier there are strong arguments against excessive competition in the banking sector, 
as margins could be eroded leading to reckless risk taking. As regards consumer welfare, a good 
example is the TBTF subsidy. This amounts to abuse of stronger competitive position. So in 
theory there ought to be welfare losses emanating from the discussed funding cost squeeze on 
competition. While these are still to be measured,124 it may also be the case that the TBTF 
subsidy translates into gains for consumers, as banks pass on their funding advantage to their 
customers, primarily in the shape of lower interest rates. In addition, the subsidy makes TBTF 
banks more attractive to capital market investors and thus easier to raise fresh capital.125 
Therefore, whether bigger and broader is better in banking has no easy answers, notwithstanding 
the all-pervasive issue of moral hazard and the ever present threat of shifting the burden of 
imprudent bank management to the taxpayers via expensive bailouts.126 
TBTF banks were rightly castigated as the main culprits of the GFC and attempts to put 
an end to them and thus to public bailouts are properly guided from a public-interest perspective. 
                                                
124 For example, it is argued that is should measured in terms of losses of potential competition. See H. 
Liu, P. Molyneux, J. O. S. Wilson, “Competition and Stability in European Banking: A Regional 
Analysis”, Working Paper, September 2010, available at 
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125 Both points are intellectual loans from a previous paper I authored jointly with Charles Goodhart and 
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Moreover, the preservation of fractional reserve banking faces colossal challenges beyond the 
possibility of a run. The quest for optimal bank organization and ending the TBTF problem may 
not be separated from the fact that such banks operate on the basis of a fractional reserve system 
that may require fiscal backstops to eliminate the possibility of multiple runs.127 By offering a 
clear model of limited purpose banking, Kotlikoff, Kay and others have highlighted leverage as 
the problem. However, as explained already, full reserve limited purpose/narrow banking model 
is fraught with intractable problems itself. These refer to the economics and mechanics of credit 
supply being very vulnerable to both predatory and bona fide competitors offering better rates. 
Accordingly, it is the duty of epistemic and regulatory communities to identify one or a number 
of optimal structural models, which ought to also target the boundary problem128 and foster long-
term growth.129 Higher capital requirements and especially leverage controls have lots of 
potential to make banks more stable and the establishment of tailor-made resolution regimes 
amounts to a significant step to avert the panic that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Nonetheless, assumptions about the power of post-2008 resolution regimes to internalize 
the cost of bank failures, eliminating TBTF moral hazard and attendant competitive distortions, 
                                                
127 See also D. Schoenmaker, “A Fiscal Backstop to the Banking System”, Duisenberg School of Finance 
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128 An excellent exposition of the border problem is offered in C. Goodhart, “How Should We Regulate 
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contain a considerable amount of wishful thinking, until proven otherwise. Especially in the 
context of big international bank resolution, limited fiscal backstops will remain, under different 
guises.130 Perhaps this limited fiscal prop on ring-fenced or segregated banks is the cost that 
society is asked to pay for the benefit of fractional reserve banking. And this will probably 
remain the case until another organizational form emerged, which would replace fractional 
reserve banks as providers of liquidity (virtually) on demand and would answer, at the same time, 
most of the questions raised so far regarding financial stability, competition, and consumer 
welfare. Hopefully, any such model would bring within the regulatory umbrella, even in part, 
shadow-banking activities and would accentuate the importance of long-term growth finance for 
financial stability. 
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